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INTRODUCTION 
Historically, minorities have often looked to federal and state courts as a source of 
protection and for recognizing their equal rights.  Within the last few years, legal questions 
regarding the treatment of same-sex couples and whether to bring such couples within the ambit 
of civil marriage have been addressed in these courts, as well as in various state legislatures, 
voting booths and, the nation’s popular discourse.  The trajectory of public opinion on this 
subject has largely moved toward support throughout this time, and yet governmental steps 
toward recognizing same-sex couples have often been met with political backlash and popular 
outrage.  In examining the chronology of certain relevant judicial decisions and their effects, this 
Note will propose state courts as the most appropriate way forward for advocates of marriage 
equality. 
Part I will discuss various court decisions that affected the rights of gays and lesbians 
over the course of the last decade, with an emphasis on public and political responses to those 
decisions.  Part II will discuss a theoretical framework for granting broader inclusion and greater 
protection of minority groups, generally, and gays and lesbians, specifically.  Part III will 
propose state courts as the best way forward for achieving change that aims to be permanent and 
non-controversial in this context. 
 I. COURT DECISIONS AFFECTING THE RIGHTS OF GAYS AND LESBIANS 
 Recognizing marriage equality and other forms of protection and inclusion for gays and 
lesbians has taken many forms over the past decade, with judicial decisions often at the center of 
providing such rights.  Accordingly, this Part will examine an illustrative group of judicial 
opinions at both the federal and state level throughout that period, with an emphasis on public 
and political reaction to those opinions. 
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A.  Vermont’s Legislative Remand 
 In 1999’s Baker v. State, the Vermont Supreme Court struck down the state’s then-
existing marriage statute on grounds that, in denying gay couples the “common benefits and 
protections that flow from marriage under Vermont law,” excluding those couples from matters 
such as health-insurance benefits and inheritance rights violated the state’s constitution.1  
Meanwhile, the court ultimately deferred to the state legislature in deciding how the law should 
be revised in compliance with its constitutional mandate.2  In so doing, the court acknowledged 
the possibility of granting same-sex couples an “alternative legal status” to traditional marriage 
by way of a domestic-partnership act, and noted the potentially “disruptive and unforeseen 
consequences” that a sudden change in marriage laws could have.3 
 The Vermont Supreme Court went on to offer several reasons in support of its legislative 
remand.  First, on separation-of-powers grounds, the court considered crafting a remedy for the 
unconstitutional marriage statute a legislative prerogative.4  Next, the court recognized that, 
without legislative guidelines in place regarding the rights or status of gay couples, more explicit 
judicial action taken by the court—e.g., granting marriage rights—could lead to “uncertainty and 
confusion.”5  Last, the court acknowledged the political consequences that such judicial action 
would entail, and hesitated to place the court within the “political cauldron” of public debate.6 
Regardless of the Baker court’s apparent concern over constitutional roles, practical 
confusion, and political fallout, the legislative remand seemingly sparked—or at the very least, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 867 (Vt. Sup. Ct. 1999); see V.T. CONST. ch. I, art. 7 (“That government is, or ought 
to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection, and security of the people, nation, or community, and not for the 
particular emolument or advantage of any single person, family, or set of persons, who are a part only of that 
community.”). 
2 Baker, 744 A.2d at 886. 
3 Id. at 887. 
4 Id. at 886. 
5 Id. at 887. 
6 Id. at 888. 
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illuminated—the vocal, polarized nature of the gay-marriage debate as Vermont’s legislature 
subsequently deliberated over reworking the marriage statute.7  Indeed, polling at the time found 
that 38% of Vermont’s citizens agreed with the court’s ruling, while 52% disagreed and 10% 
were uncertain.8  Opponents of Baker saw the decision as the outgrowth of judicial activism, 
which is ironic in light of the court’s apprehension regarding the so-called cauldron of public 
debate and the court’s corresponding deference to the state legislature.9 
Subsequently, and in a possible attempt to accommodate split public opinion regarding 
homosexuals’ rights,10 Vermont’s legislature became the first state to pass a bill offering gay 
couples a “civil union” status.11  The law went into effect on July 1, 2000, and, while falling 
short of expanding the state’s definition of marriage to cover gay couples,12 the civil union 
afforded such couples the legal rights and responsibilities associated with traditional marriage.13   
In sum, Vermont’s decade-old grapple that led to its recognition of civil unions was 
defined largely by measures aimed at compromise, with an implicit goal of avoiding controversy: 
first through the Baker court’s deference to the state legislature, and then through the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Carey Goldberg, Forced Into Action on Gay Marriage, Vermont Finds Itself Deeply Split, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 
2000, at A16.  By way of example, in spite of the state’s relatively meager 600,000-person population, over a 
thousand people came to subsequent public hearings at the state House, with a similar number protesting at nearby 
rallies.  Similarly, Governor Howard Dean’s office fielded an “unheard-of” 13,000 phone calls regarding the 
potential aftermath of Baker.  Id. 
8 Id.; see also id. (noting that 49% favored overturning Baker via constitutional amendment while 44% opposed such 
an amendment). 
9 See, e.g., Joseph A. Reinert, The Myth of Judicial Activism, 29 VT. B.J. & L. DIG. 35 (2004) (discussing criticism 
of Baker as “judicial activism”); David Orgon Coolidge & William C. Duncan, Beyond Baker: The Case for a 
Vermont Marriage Amendment, 25 VT. L. REV. 61 (2000). 
10 See Barbara J. Cox, But Why Not Marriage: An Essay on Vermont’s Civil Unions Law, Same-Sex Marriage, and 
Separate But (Un)Equal, 25 VT. L. REV. 113, 123-37 (2000) (arguing that Vermont’s “politically-expedient 
compromise” reinforces societal notions of heterosexual supremacy). 
11 An Act Relating to Civil Unions, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1201-07 (Supp. 2000). 
12 Vermont did subsequently grant full marital rights to same-sex couples, ultimately through a legislative override 
of the state governor’s veto.  See infra note 15-17 and accompanying text. 
13 Id. at § 1204(a); see also id. at § 1204(e)(1) (providing a “nonexclusive list of legal benefits, protections and 
responsibilities” that would extend to couples in state-recognized civil unions, including laws relating to title, 
intestate succession or other incidents of the acquisition, ownership, or transfer of real or personal property; causes 
of action dependent on spousal status; probate law; adoption law; group insurance for state employees; spousal 
abuse programs; prohibitions against discrimination based on marital status; victims’ and workers’ compensation 
benefits; medical and terminal care; and family leave and public assistance benefits). 
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legislature’s creation of a statutory label that offered the substance of state-recognized marriage 
without the title that would otherwise accompany it.  And yet, the relatively novel introduction of 
a legal status for gays and lesbians nevertheless led to political backlash and public outcry with 
each step in the process. 
Moreover, the ensuing backlash and outcry was not exclusive to Vermont itself: at the 
national level, two states enacted constitutional bans and seven state legislatures passed statutory 
restrictions on same-sex marriage in the four years following Baker.14  For Vermont, though, the 
initial “political cauldron” that the state’s high court reluctantly entered into in deciding Baker 
ultimately subsided.  Vermont recognized same-sex marriage on September 1, 2009, after the 
legislature overrode the governor’s veto of a marriage bill that was introduced in the state House 
on February 9, 2007.15  That measure marked the first time in nineteen years that Vermont’s 
legislature had overridden a governor’s veto.16  So, with the passage of time, the politically 
accountable legislators of Vermont ultimately decided overwhelmingly in favor of same-sex 
marriage, with the bill ultimately enacted by a vote of 23-5 in the state Senate and 100-49 in the 
state House.17   
 Along with Vermont, whose ten-year process of judicial decisions and various legislative 
measures eventually ended in a grant of equal marriage rights for gays and lesbians, many states 
and localities have enacted laws pertaining to same-sex marriage and other gay rights over that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Nebraska and Nevada passed constitutional bans; California, Colorado, Connecticut, Missouri, South Dakota, 
West Virginia, and Texas all banned same-sex marriage statutorily.  See Thomas M. Keck, Beyond Backlash: 
Assessing the Impact of Judicial Decisions on LGBT Rights, 43 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 151, 173 (2009). 
15 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 8.  The new law changed the state’s definition of marriage from “one man and one 
woman” to “two people,” and stated that all terms “relating to the marital relationship or familial relationships shall 
be construed consistently with this section for all purposes throughout the law, whether in the context of statute, 
administrative or court rule, policy, common law, or any other source of civil law.” 
16 See Kirstin Carlson, Governor Vetoes Same-Sex Marriage Bill, WCAX.com, Apr. 6, 2009, available at 
http://www.wcax.com/Global/story.asp?S=10139384 (last visited Apr. 1, 2010). 
17 See Jason Szep, Vermont Becomes 4th State to Allow Gay Marriage, REUTERS, Apr. 7, 2009, available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN0745825320090408 (last visited Apr. 1, 2010). 
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same period.18  Those decisions have often been spurred by court opinions, whether directly 
through a state legislature’s reaction to a binding court decision regarding gay rights, or 
indirectly via the heightened awareness and legislative interest in addressing gay rights that came 
with the general rise in litigation over same-sex issues.19 
B.  Lawrence v. Texas 
Within the federal sphere, courts have closely adhered to the status quo of a 1972 U.S. 
Supreme Court decision that dismissed a claim regarding same-sex marriage “for want of a 
substantial federal question.”20  Irrespective of this reluctance and restraint, the Court addressed 
and struck down a state’s sodomy law that uniquely criminalized gays in 2003’s Lawrence v. 
Texas.21   The federal decision, issued at a time in which many states were responding to calls for 
the recognition of civil unions and the legalization of same-sex marriage, appears somewhat 
anachronistic by comparison.  Nevertheless, the varying opinions of the Court irrevocably 
brought same-sex issues and the ultimate question of marriage equality into the nation’s 
collective consciousness, causing an ensuing polarization of public opinion and a significant 
drop in support for gay rights. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 See Keck, supra note 14, at 173, tbl. 5. 
19 See Keck, supra note 14, at 161, tbl. 1 (giving a timeline of the electoral aftermath of judicial victories for 
advocates of gay rights).  
20 Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810, 810 (1972); see, e.g., Citizens for Equal Protection v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859, 871 
(8th Cir. 2006) (overturning a U.S. District Court decision that held Nebraska’s state constitutional amendment 
banning same-sex marriage to be unconstitutional as a bill of attainder and as a violation of the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments).  To wit: 
In the nearly one hundred and fifty years since the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, to our 
knowledge no Justice of the Supreme Court has suggested that a state statute or constitutional 
provision codifying the traditional definition of marriage violates the Equal Protection Clause or 
any other provision of the United States Constitution.  Indeed, in Baker v. Nelson, when faced 
with a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to a decision by the Supreme Court of Minnesota 
denying a marriage license to a same-sex couple, the United States Supreme Court dismissed “for 
want of a substantial federal question.”  There is good reason for this restraint. 
Id. at 870-71 (internal citation omitted). 
21 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
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 1. The Court’s Opinions 
 In Lawrence, the United States Supreme Court examined a Texas statute that 
criminalized consensual sexual intimacy when such conduct was between adults of the same 
sex.22  Writing for the five-justice majority, Justice Kennedy wrote that “[l]iberty protects the 
person from unwarranted government intrusions into a dwelling or other private places [and] 
presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain 
intimate conduct.”23  In so stating, the Court overruled Bowers v. Hardwick,24 its 1986 decision 
that denied the existence of a “fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy.”25  That is, 
based on the right to liberty granted by the Constitution’s Due Process Clause,26 the Court 
declared that gays and lesbians were entitled to respect for their private lives, and that Texas 
could not “demean their existence” or “control their destiny” by criminalizing their private 
consensual conduct.27 
The Lawrence majority also addressed an argument that the sodomy statute’s apparent 
discrimination based on sexual orientation was invalid under the Equal Protection Clause.28  
While “a tenable argument,” the Court was concerned that rejecting the statute on equal 
protection grounds would necessarily leave open the question of “whether a prohibition would be 
valid if drawn differently, say, to prohibit the conduct both between same-sex and different-sex 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Id. at 564. 
23 Id. at 562. 
24 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
25 Id. at 191. 
26 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). 
27 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578; see also id. at 574: 
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, 
choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of 
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these 
matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the 
State. 
Id. (quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992). 
28 Id. at 574; see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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participants.”29  The Court was unwilling to leave the state free to rewrite its law with such an 
end, and the aforementioned right to liberty under the Due Process Clause therefore provided the 
sole basis for the majority’s decision to strike down the statute.30 
 Notably, the Court avoided discussing the merits of legalizing same-sex marriage, in spite 
of the concurrent governmental efforts toward dealing with the issue at various state and local 
levels31 and the strong implications for that subject that the Lawrence opinion at least arguably 
held.32  Justice O’Connor, however, at least broached the subject in a concurring opinion.33  
Examining the equal protection argument raised by the plaintiffs, Justice O’Connor’s concurring 
opinion was premised on the principle that a legislative “desire to harm a politically unpopular 
group” cannot form a legitimate governmental interest.34  Within that framework, that the statute 
“treat[ed] the same conduct differently based solely on the participants” was enough for Justice 
O’Connor to find the anti-gay animus necessary to strike down the sodomy statute based on her 
understanding of equal protection.35  Nevertheless, in apparently addressing her opinion’s 
implications for gay marriage, Justice O’Connor insisted that, beyond “mere moral disapproval” 
of gays, reasons including “preserving the traditional institution of marriage” would still support 
statutory distinctions on the basis of sexual identity.36 
 In a dissenting opinion joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, Justice 
Scalia was unconvinced by Justice O’Connor’s regard for the traditional definition of marriage.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574-75; but see id. at 579-85 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
30 See supra, notes 23-27 and accompanying text. 
31 See infra Section I.A and supra Sections I.C and I.D.  Curiously, the majority did note that American “laws and 
tradition afford constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, 
family relationships, child rearing, and education,” but did not distinguish marriage in this sense from the same-sex 
context addressed in Justice Scalia’s dissent.   Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574 (emphasis added). 
32 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 604-05 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
33 Id. at 585 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
34 Id. at 580; see, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 
(1985); Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (all supporting Justice O’Connor’s rationale for striking 
down the Texas statute on equal protection grounds). 
35 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 581. 
36 Id. at 585. 
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Justice Scalia claimed that O’Connor’s acknowledgment of preserving the traditional institution 
of marriage was a mere euphemism for moral disapproval, and that, in any instance, 
distinguishing between laws seeking to preserve traditional sexual mores and those that express 
moral disapproval would prove unworkable.37  Emphasizing the Court’s responsibility to carry 
principles to their logical conclusion, Justice Scalia asked: 
If moral disapprobation of homosexual conduct is “no legitimate state interest” 
for purposes of proscribing that conduct,38 and if, as the Court coos (casting aside 
all pretense of neutrality), “[w]hen sexuality finds overt expression in intimate 
conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal 
bond that is more enduring,”39 what justification could there possibly be for 
denying the benefits of marriage to homosexual couples exercising “[t]he liberty 
protected by the Constitution?”40 
 
In concluding, Justice Scalia warned that, inasmuch as the Court’s work depends on principle 
and logic, its opinion in Lawrence had significant implications for gay marriage.41 
 2. Lawrence’s Effect on Public Discourse and Opinion 
 Justice Scalia’s assertion that Lawrence placed the Court’s jurisprudence on a slippery 
slope toward legalizing same-sex marriage did in some sense prove to be accurate: though the 
Lawrence majority’s decision avoided discussion of marriage equality, the opinion nevertheless 
sparked widespread discussion of the topic and seemingly moved public opinion toward 
opposition.  Indeed, press coverage following Lawrence focused overwhelmingly on the issue of 
gay marriage, with the issue becoming the focal point of popular understandings of the Court’s 
opinion.  The day after Lawrence was decided, for example, over fifty stories about gay marriage 
ran in major U.S. newspapers.42  And as Figure 1 illustrates, the press’ treatment of the subject 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Id. at 602-03 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
38 Id. at 578 (majority opinion). 
39 Id. at 567. 
40 Id. at 604-05 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 567 (majority opinion)). 
41 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 605. 
42 LexisNexis, “Major Papers” archive.  See infra note 44 (explaining the “Major Papers” archive). 
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continued beyond these day-after reports of the decision itself and initially peaked the month 
after Lawrence was issued, with over 1500 newspaper stories about marriage equality appearing 
nationally in August, 2003.43  Furthermore, the decision appeared to irrevocably place the issue 
in the national spotlight; while major newspapers mentioned same-sex marriage just over 300 
times between January and March, 2003, the subject apparently rose in prominence and gained a 
foothold within the nation’s discourse because of Lawrence.  That is, the Court’s decision 
transformed the subject into a staple for reporters and columnists: even currently, it is rare for a 
month to pass with less than 500 national headlines devoted to the issue of marriage equality. 
Figure 1: Number of Articles in Major Newspapers that Mention Same-Sex Marriage in Each 
Month44 
 
 Moreover, it appears that Lawrence was but the first event and a possible catalyst for a 
series of events brought extensive coverage and interest to the issue of gay marriage.  Subsequent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 See infra fig. 1. 
44 This data is derived from LexisNexis’s “Major Papers” archive.  The sources included in that archive are U.S. 
papers listed in the top fifty by circulation in Editor & Publisher Year Book and newspapers published outside the 
U.S. that are written in English and either listed as national newspapers in Benn's World Media Directory or one of 
the top 5% in circulation for the country.  See LexisNexis, Major Papers, 
http://web.lexis.com/xchange/ccsubs/viewfullMajorPapers.asp (last visited Apr. 1, 2010).  I conducted searches of 
that archive for each month from January, 2003, to December, 2009.  The terms used were “homosexual! gay! same-
sex /10 marriage!,” which gathered results for each article that used the terms homosexual (or homosexuals), gay (or 
gays) or same-sex within ten words of the term marriage (or marriages). 
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events, each of which brought a smaller spike in newspaper coverage for the issue,45 included the 
Vatican’s condemnation of same-sex marriage in August, 2003;46 the Supreme Court of 
Connecticut’s Goodridge opinions in November, 2003, and February, 2004;47 the city of San 
Francisco’s decision to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples on February 12, 2004;48 
President Bush’s announcement of his support for a constitutional amendment banning gay 
marriage on February 23, 2004;49 and the defeat of that amendment in the United States Senate 
on July 14, 2004.50 
 Throughout this period of intense public debate and heightened scrutiny from the media, 
public support for gay marriage declined considerably, as illustrated by Figure 3.51  Opposition 
Figure 2: Public Opinion Polling on the Question of Legalizing Same-Sec Marriage, 2003-0552	  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 See supra fig. 2. 
46 See, e.g., Frank Bruni, Vatican Exhorts Legislators to Reject Same-Sex Unions, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2003, at A16. 
47 See infra Section ___. 
48 See, e.g., Rachel Gordon, Uncharted Territory: Bush’s Stance Led Newsom to Take Action, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 15, 
2004, available at http://articles.sfgate.com/2004-02-15/news/17411152_1_lesbian-couples-same-sex-marriage-gay-
rights. 
49 See, e.g., David Stout, Bush Backs Ban in Constitution on Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2004, at A1. 
50 See, e.g., Helen Dewar & Alan Cooperman, Senate Scuttles Amendment Banning Same-Sex Marriage, WASH. 
POST, July 14, 2004, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A49537-2004Jul14.html (last 
visited Apr. 1, 2010). 
51 See infra fig. 3. 
52 This graph represents most polls on this question collected by PollingReport.com.  See PollingReport.com, Same-
Sex Marriage, Gay Rights, http://pollingreport.com/civil.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2010).  I have omitted polls in 
which the gay-marriage question was presented alongside a civil-union option. 
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Figure 3: Public Opinion Polling on the Question of Legalizing Gay Marriage: 1985-2008 
rose significantly in the wake of Lawrence, and was unrelenting throughout 2004.  Beyond a 
mere numerical crest on the side of keeping gay marriage illegal, polling around the time of the 
2004 elections revealed the highly polarized nature of that opposition.  Over half of those against 
gay marriage would not support a candidate with which they disagreed on that issue, while less 
than 25% of gay-marriage proponents felt that same way.53  Meanwhile, and perhaps 
surprisingly, the percentage of the public without an opinion on the subject remained somewhat 
steady throughout this time.54  Figure 3 further illustrates the uniqueness of the 2004-2005 period 
within the historical scope of public opinion regarding gay marriage.55 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Pew Research Center, Gay Marriage a Voting Issue, But Mostly For Opponents, Feb. 27, 2004, available at 
http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/204.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2010). 
54 See supra fig. 3. 
55 See infra fig. 4, Charles Franklin, Gay Marriage Support and Opposition, Pollster.com, May 21, 2008, available 
at http://www.pollster.com/blogs/gay_marriage_support_and_oppos.php (last visited Apr. 1, 2010). 
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Perhaps inadvertently, the Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence permanently brought 
the subject of gay marriage into the public discourse.  And, while its aftermath sparked a 
polarization of popular opinion and an arguable political backlash, those effects were short-lived, 
and in some ways overcome.  Nevertheless, Lawrence and its aftermath shows the potential 
effects that a sweeping Supreme Court decision can have on public opinion. 
 C.  Judicial Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage in Massachusetts 
 On November 18, 2003, less than four months after the Supreme Court’s Lawrence 
opinion was announced, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts legalized same-sex 
marriage in the state through its opinion in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health.56  There, 
the state’s high court found no rational basis for denying civil marriage to same-sex couples in 
the face of a state constitution that purports to “affirm[] the dignity and equality of all 
individuals” and “forbid[] the creation of second-class citizens.”57  That is, “[l]imiting the 
protections, benefits, and obligations of civil marriage to opposite-sex couples” was an affront to 
the Massachusetts Constitution’s protections of individual liberty and equality, and had left 
same-sex couples “excluded from the full range of human experience.”58  The court therefore 
preserved the state’s marriage-licensing statute and refined the common-law definition of civil 
marriage to mean “the voluntary union of two persons as spouses, to the exclusion of all 
others.”59  It stayed its entry of judgment for 180 days to allow the legislature to amend existing 
statutes to the constitutional protections discussed in Goodridge.60 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (2003). 
57 Id. at 948. 
58 Id. at 957, 968.  The court listed some of the benefits that flow from civil marriage, including tangible rights in 
property, probate, tax, and evidence law, as well as the intangible private and social advantages that flow from 
marriage, which the court placed “among life’s momentous acts of self-definition.”  Id. at 955-57. 
59 Id. at 969. 
60 Id. at 970. 
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 During that 180-day period, the Massachusetts Senate introduced a bill that would have 
offered same-sex couples a civil-union status in lieu of full marriage rights.61  The Senate 
subsequently petitioned the state’s high court for an advisory opinion regarding that bill, which 
the court then rejected as maintaining an “unconstitutional, inferior, and discriminatory status for 
same-sex couples.”62  As an apparent attempt at a Vermont-style compromise regarding gay 
rights, the rejected bill would have put the issue in the hands of the legislature.  Such a measure 
would have been consistent with public opinion within the state: after Goodridge, polling 
showed that 52% of Massachusetts’ citizens thought the issue should be decided by the 
legislature, while only 29% favored judicial decisionmaking in the context of same-sex 
marriage.63 Accordingly, the state legislature subsequently proposed a constitutional amendment 
that would have defined marriage as exclusively between a man and a woman.64  That 
amendment—which, under state law, would have required fifty of two-hundred legislators’ votes 
to be submitted to the public in a subsequent election—was defeated by a vote of 151 to 45 on 
June 14, 2007, which allowed Goodridge to endure as the state’s ongoing posture with regard to 
same-sex marriage.65 
Meanwhile, public opinion regarding the proper venue for deciding this issue cannot 
easily be distinguished from individual views on the merits of the issue itself and the presumed 
corresponding views of the relevant government branches.  In other words, a stance against a 
court opinion endorsing same-sex marriage may be a proxy for a stance against same-sex 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 In re Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 566 (2004) 
62 Id. at 566, 572. 
63 Scott S. Greenberger, One Year Later, Nation Divided on Gay Marriage, BOSTON GLOBE, May 15, 2005, 
available at 
http://www.boston.com/news/specials/gay_marriage/articles/2005/05/15/one_year_later_nation_divided_on_gay_m
arriage. 
64 Pam Belluck, Massachusetts Gay Marriage to Remain Legal, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2007, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/15/us/15gay.html. 
65 Id. 
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marriage itself.  In February, 2004, for example, 42% of Massachusetts’ citizens favored the 
state’s recognition of same-sex marriage, while 44% opposed it,66 which closely mirrors the 
narrow majority that opposed theoretical judicial action on same-sex marriage at the time. 
The evenly divided state of public opinion in Massachusetts just after Goodridge is 
consistent with such sentiments at the national level.  In comparison to the February, 2004, 
Massachusetts poll that found 42% in favor of same-sex marriage, seven national polls 
conducted in that same month indicated favorability levels of somewhere between 30% and 
39%.67  So, while a larger minority of Massachusetts’ citizens approved same-sex marriage than 
in the nation as a whole at the time, that strong minority was still unable to avoid some political 
backlash68 and the specter of a constitutional amendment that would have reversed the Supreme 
Judicial Court’s Goodridge opinion.69  And, beyond these effects within Massachusetts, twenty-
three states enacted constitutional bans on same-sex marriage in the four years following 
Goodridge.70 
Nevertheless, a long-term view of the practical effects of Goodridge within 
Massachusetts shows that the decision produced a strong trend toward support of same-sex 
marriage.  Polling conducted in August, 2008, showed that 59% favored and 32% opposed 
marriage equality, an increase of 17% in favorability from four years before.71  This increase has 
greatly outweighed the trend in support at the national level; nationally, polling in July and 
August, 2008, revealed an average level of support around 40%, an increase of about 5% over 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 David Filipov, Five Years Later, Views Shift Subtly on Gay Marriage, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 17, 2008, available 
at 
http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2008/11/17/5_years_later_views_shift_subtly_on_gay_m
arriage. 
67 See PollingReport.com, supra note 52. 
68 See Keck, supra note 14, at 162 (noting that seven legislators that favored same-sex marriage faced primary 
challenges in the wake of Goodridge). 
69 See Belluck, supra note 64. 
70 See Keck, supra note 14, at 173. 
71 See Filipov, supra note 66. 
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Figure 4: Comparing Public Opinion Polling in Massachusetts and at the National 
Level after Goodridge 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     Feb. 2004        Feb. 2008 
the prior four years.72  Furthermore, Massachusetts’ legalization of gay marriage may have had 
the long-term effect of solidifying public opinion, with 9% of the state’s citizens remaining 
undecided on the issue in 2008 as compared with 14% in 2004.73   
                       
 
 
D.  Iowa’s Recent Decision in Favor of Marriage Equality 
 On April 3, 2009, the Supreme Court of Iowa issued its opinion in Varnum v. Brien,74 
which examined and ultimately struck down a 1998 state statute that declared that “[o]nly a 
marriage between a male and female is valid.”75 Upon determining that gays and lesbians were at 
least a quasi-suspect class under Iowa’s equal protection law, the court subjected the marriage 
statute to intermediate scrutiny.76  Accordingly, the court examined the alleged justifications for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 See infra Fig. 4; PollingReport.com, supra note 52. 
73 See Filipov, supra note 66; cf. supra note 54 and accompanying text (noting that the number of citizens undecided 
on the issue of same-sex marriage remained fairly constant at the national level in the years immediately following 
the Supreme Court’s Lawrence opinion). 
74 763 N.W.2d 862 (2009). 
75 IOWA CODE § 595.2(1) (2009). 
76 Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 896.  “To withstand intermediate scrutiny, a statutory classification must be substantially 
related to an important governmental objective. . . . To this end, courts evaluate whether the proffered governmental 
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the statute in question, which included protecting traditional definitions of marriage, providing 
an optimal environment to raise children, promoting procreation and stability for opposite-sex 
couples, and conserving state resources exclusively allocated for the benefit of married couples.77  
The court went on, stating: 
Having examined each proffered governmental objective through the appropriate 
lens of intermediate scrutiny, we conclude the sexual-orientation-based 
classification under the marriage statute does not substantially further any of the 
objectives. While the objectives asserted may be important (and many 
undoubtedly are important), none are furthered in a substantial way by the 
exclusion of same-sex couples from civil marriage. Our equal protection clause 
requires more than has been offered to justify the continued existence of the 
same-sex marriage ban under the statute.78 
 
Based on its analysis, Iowa’s high court held that creating a parallel civil institution for same-sex 
couples—i.e., a civil union or domestic partnership—would be insufficient for equal protection 
purposes, and that the state would henceforth allow gays and lesbians “full access to the 
institution of civil marriage.”79 
 At the time Varnum was issued, only 36% of Iowa’s citizens were in favor of extending 
marriage rights to same-sex couples.80  This view lagged national support levels considerably, 
with four nationwide polls conducted in that same month showing respective support levels of 
35%, 38%, 44%, and 49%.81  Furthermore, Iowa became the third state to offer same-sex 
marriage while it remained illegal in forty-seven other states; among those states, polling reveals 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
objectives are important and whether the statutory classification is substantially related to the achievement of those 
objectives.”  Id. at 896-97 (internal citations and quotations omitted).  See also IOWA CONST. art I, § 6 (granting 
equal protection to all citizens within the state). 
77 Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 898-904. 
78 Id. at 904. 
79 Id. at 907; see id. at 906-07. 
80 See Jeffrey R. Lax & Justin H. Phillips, Gay Rights in the States: Public Opinion and Policy Responsiveness, 103 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. (forthcoming 2010), available at 
http://www.columbia.edu/~jrl2124/Lax_Phillips_Gay_Policy_Responsiveness_2009.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2010). 
81 See PollingReport.com, supra note 52. 
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that twenty-five showed stronger levels of support for same-sex marriage than Iowa did at the 
time Varnum was decided.82 
 In spite of the state of Iowa’s status as a relative outlier in recognizing marriage equality, 
the issue has largely proved uncontroversial.  While initial post-Varnum polling showed that 
Iowans were split 41%-40% on whether they would vote for a constitutional amendment banning 
same-sex marriage, 92% of the state’s citizens said that marriage equality had brought “no real 
change to their lives.”83  Perhaps accordingly, polling in February, 2010, showed that 62% of 
Iowans thought same-sex marriage unworthy of the state legislature’s attention, with only 14% 
stating that they considered the issue one of the top three priorities facing the state.84  In sum, 
Iowa’s recent history with this issue shows that, even in the face of a population’s serious 
hesitation about recognizing marriage equality, a judicial opinion will not necessarily suffer 
political backlash or legislative setbacks at the present time. 
II. A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR GRANTING BROADER INCLUSION AND GREATER 
PROTECTION TO MINORITY GROUPS 
A.  Same-Sex Marriage and Sequential Incrementalism   
At both the state and federal level, it is axiomatic that policymaking often correlates with 
trends in public opinion.85  Meanwhile, over the past thirty years, public opinion regarding gay 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 See Lax & Phillips, supra note 80. 
83 Jason Clayworth & Thomas Beaumont, Iowa Poll: Iowans Evenly Divided on Gay Marriage Ban, DES MOINES 
REG., Sept. 21, 2009, at A3, available at 
http://www.desmoinesregister.com/article/20090921/NEWS10/909210321/Iowa-Poll--Iowans-evenly-divided-on-
gay-marriage-ban (last visited Apr. 1, 2010). 
84 Thomas Beaumont, Iowans Rate Drivers Texting as More Urgent than Gay Marriage, DES MOINES REG., Feb. 8, 
2010, at A7, available at http://www.desmoinesregister.com/article/20100208/NEWS10/2080322/Iowans-rate-
drivers-texting-as-more-urgent-than-gay-marriage (last visited Apr. 1, 2010). 
85 See, e.g., James A. Stimson, Michael B. MacKuen & Robert S. Erikson, Dynamic Representation, 89 AM. POL. 
SCI. REV. 543 (1995) (discussing such a correlation at the national level); Paul Burstein, The Impact of Public 
Opinion on Policy: A Review of an Agenda, 56 POL. RES. Q. 29, 38-39 (2003) (discussing such a correlation at the 
state level). 
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rights has “moved unambiguously toward acceptance and tolerance.”86  Through various means, 
including judicial opinion, legislative proclamation, and the will of the electorate within the 
states and at the federal level, a series of legal changes have accompanied the popular trajectory 
of acceptance and tolerance.  Generally, such changes have brought broader inclusion of gays 
and lesbians in the public sphere and greater protection for the rights of this minority, as 
illustrated by court decisions like Vermont’s Baker v. State, Massachusetts’ Goodridge v. 
Department of Public Health, Iowa’s Varnum v. Brien, and the U.S. Supreme Court’s Lawrence 
v. Texas.87  For advocates of change, at the center of this movement is the objective of ending all 
governmental discrimination and offering every right and responsibility that heterosexuals enjoy 
as public citizens to gays and lesbians.88  Within that framework, equal access to civil marriage is 
the ultimate goal.89  Civil marriage, here, is both the centerpiece of equality in the public sphere90 
and the sole entryway to the “allocation of a host of public and private benefits.”91 
 With regard to achieving equal access to civil marriage, recent history and an 
examination of international approaches to legal inclusion and protection for gays and lesbians 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 Patrick J. Egan, Nathaniel Persily, & Kevin Wallsten, Gay Rights, in PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONTROVERSY 234, 235 (Nathaniel Persily, Jack Citrin, & Patrick J. Egan ed., 2008). 
87 What I term “inclusion” would include same-sex marriage, which will be the primary focus here.  See, e.g., 
Goodridge v. Dep’t of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (discussed infra Section I.C).  “Protection” 
would include laws against discrimination.  See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12 (West 1993) (prohibiting 
discrimination in employment, housing, credit, or public accommodation); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 4 (1998) 
(prohibiting discrimination in employment, housing, and credit).  See generally supra Part I (discussing Baker, 
Lawrence, Goodridge, and Varnum.) 
88 See, e.g., ANDREW SULLIVAN, VIRTUALLY NORMAL 171 (1996). 
89 Id. at 178. 
90 See, e.g., id. at 179 (“Marriage is not simply a private contract; it is a social and public recognition of a private 
commitment.  As such, it is the highest public recognition of personal integrity.  Denying it to homosexuals is the 
most public affront possible to their public equality.”). 
91 GEORGE CHAUNCEY, WHY MARRIAGE: THE HISTORY SHAPING TODAY'S DEBATE OVER GAY EQUALITY 71 (2004); 
see Mary L. Bonauto, Goodridge in Context, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 5 (2005) (noting that “several hundred 
state laws and 1138 federal laws . . . use marital status as a factor”). 
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reveal a pattern of sequential incrementalism.92  That is, almost without exception, governmental 
recognition of same-sex marriage comes at the tail end of a step-by-step process.  To wit: 
Registered partnership laws, just short of same-sex marriage, have not been 
adopted until a particular country has first decriminalized consensual sodomy and 
equalized the age of consent for homosexual and heterosexual intercourse, then 
has adopted laws prohibiting employment and other kinds of discrimination 
against gay people, and finally has provided other kinds of more limited state 
recognition for same-sex relationships, such as the giving of legal benefits to or 
the enforcing of legal obligations on cohabiting same-sex couples.93  
 
The lessons of this process are that the next “step” in the sequence appears to only be 
achievable after completing the prior one, and that each step apparently operates as a 
“stimulating factor” for the next one.94  While the former principle may be a logical necessity to 
the path toward broader inclusion and protection,95 the latter has important implications for 
considering how social change should be pursued in this context. 
Commentator Kees Waaldijk has termed this pattern of sequential incrementalism the 
“law of small change.”96  Indeed, the so-called “law of small change” has been illustrated by the 
legal inclusion and protection of gays and lesbians in a variety of countries, including the United 
Kingdom, Romania, Spain, Austria, and the Netherlands.97  Irrespective of the controversy that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Comparative Law and the Same-Sex Marriage Debate: A Step-By-Step Approach 
Toward State Recognition, 31 MCGEORGE L. REV. 641, 647-48. 
93 Id. at 648. 
94 Kees Waaldijk, Small Change: How the Road to Same-Sex Marriage Got Paved in the Netherlands, in LEGAL 
RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS 437, 440 (Robert Wintemute & Mads Andenaes eds., 2001); see also 
Eskridge, supra note 92, at 648: 
[L]aw cannot move unless public opinion moves, but public attitudes can be influenced by 
changes in the law. For gay rights, the impasse suggested by this paradox can be ameliorated or 
broken if the proponents of reform move step-by-step along a continuum of little reforms. There 
are a number of pragmatic reasons why such a step-by-step process can break the impasse over a 
period of time. Step-by-step change permits gradual adjustment of anti-gay mindsets, slowly 
empowers gay rights advocates, and can discredit anti-gay arguments. 
95 In other words, it is not surprising that, for example, a government will ordinarily decriminalize sexual intimacy 
among gays and lesbians before granting benefits or officially acknowledging relationships for which such intimacy 
is an important facet.  
96 Waaldijk, supra note 94, at 440. 
97 Id. at 440-41. 
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occasionally comes with referencing foreign law in this context,98 these comparative examples 
and the recurring pattern of change provides a basis for understanding the trajectory of same-sex 
marriage in the United States.  
B.  The Role of the Courts in Granting Equal Rights 
 A popular understanding of the role of the courts suggests that the judiciary provides a 
countermajoritarian weight upon the balance struck within our democratic society.  Justice 
Black, for example, has described courts as “havens of refuge for those who might otherwise 
suffer because they are helpless, weak, outnumbered, or because they are the non-conforming 
victims of prejudice and public excitement.”99  Similarly, to Justice Brandeis, judicial review 
should act as a guard against the “occasional tyrannies of governing majorities.”100  In the 
context of granting equal rights to minorities, the countermajoritarian theory may provide hope 
for individuals and promote the potential for peaceable change.101 
 Meanwhile, at a practical level, there is some skepticism over whether courts have the 
ability or desire to play a countermajoritarian role in this context.102  Alternatively, judicial 
review has been described as a necessary component to an ongoing conversation between the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 See, e.g,, Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (labeling the majority’s reference to foreign 
decriminalization of sodomy “meaningless” and “[d]angerous dicta”); see also Jeffrey Rosen, Immodest Proposal: 
Massachusetts Gets It Wrong on Gay Marriage, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 22, 2003, at 19, 21 (arguing that the Lawrence 
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judicial and legislative branches about “what the Constitution should mean.”103  Such a 
conversation would presumably exist without inherent countermajoritarian leanings.104  
Similarly, Professor Jack Balkin has argued that courts only protect minorities when doing so 
coincides with some form of majoritarian self-interest.105  The recent history of Supreme Court 
decisions that dealt with controversial issues supports such an argument.  As Judge Posner has 
noted: 
When the Supreme Court moved against public school segregation, it was 
bucking a regional majority but a national minority (white southerners).  When it 
outlawed the laws forbidding racially mixed marriages, only a minority of states 
had such laws on their books.  Only when all but two states had repealed their 
laws forbidding the use of contraceptives even by married couples did the 
Supreme Court invalidate the remaining laws.  It created a right of abortion 
against a background of a rapid increase in the number of lawful abortions.106 
 
Indeed, rather than mere countermajoritarian protection of the minority, the Court’s rulings in 
these cases suggests a convergence of interests between the minorities’ desired outcome, the 
majorities’ interest in acquiescence, and the trajectory of public opinion.107 
 The Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas108 shows a further example where 
converging interests resulted in a victory for a minority.  In 1961, all fifty states had laws against 
sodomy.109  Less than three decades later, however, a narrow majority of states had legalized 
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such private conduct between consenting adults.110  Similarly, public-opinion polling on the 
question of whether “homosexual relations between consensual adults should be legal” revealed 
that a then-high 59% of people favored legalization just before Lawrence was decided.111  
Indeed, beyond a mere countermajoritarian posture, it seems that a variety of factors—including 
the trajectory of public opinion and the law in other jurisdictions or at other levels—may play a 
role in courts’ decisions to grant new rights.112  Nevertheless, the recent history of marriage 
equality and its practical outworking at the state and federal level demands a balance between 
finding a convergence of relevant interests and the ultimate objective of achieving change that is 
permanent and non-controversial. 
III. STATE COURTS AS A WAY FORWARD FOR RECOGNIZING MARRIAGE EQUALITY 
 The illustrative state-level examples of judicial recognition of same-sex relationships in 
Vermont, Massachusetts, and Iowa reveal a way forward for state courts as an appropriate venue 
for deciding issues related to marriage equality.  Vermont’s high court, for example, sought to 
avoid uncertainty, confusion, and public backlash through allowing the state’s elected officials to 
remedy the incompatible nature of the state’s statutory definition of marriage and its 
constitutional commitment to equality in Baker v. State.113  This 1999 decision, an early foray 
into legally recognizing the relationships of same-sex couples in America, was nonetheless 
highly controversial and politically problematic within the state.  Furthermore, the novel decision 
produced certain negative externalities, with several states adopting measures to prevent 
marriage equality in the wake of Baker.114 
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 On the other hand, a decade later, the Supreme Court of Iowa’s unanimous opinion 
granting full marriage rights to same-sex couples, which came at a time in which a relatively 
small percentage of the state’s citizens supported the grant of such rights, produced relatively 
little backlash, with any initial controversy proving to be short-lived.115  So, while Vermont and 
Iowa had similar levels of support for marriage equality at the relative times Baker and Varnum 
were decided, those respective decisions produced widely disparate consequences.  The former 
decision was mired in controversy that eventually resulted in full marriage rights for same-sex 
couples ten years later, through the unusual circumstance of a legislative override of the state 
governor’s veto.116  The latter decision, in spite of Iowa citizens’ divided opinions, was met with 
a strong view that the decision should not be addressed by the legislature and an understanding 
that Iowa’s high court had done little to alter the lives of most of the state’s citizens.117  Indeed, 
the ten years separating Baker and Varnum reveal a sea change in the public consciousness 
regarding same-sex couples and, accordingly, political reactions to the respective court’s 
recognition of gay and lesbian rights. 
In this way, Iowa’s reaction to Varnum closely mirrors the long-term effects of the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts’ Goodridge opinion.  Support for same-sex marriage 
improved considerably in the years that followed Goodridge, and less citizens in the state 
remained undecided about the issue; both of these effects of Goodridge are significantly stronger 
than such trends at the national level.118  Together, the aftermath of Varnum and Goodridge 
demonstrate the practical outworking of the various arguments for and against marriage equality.  
That is, as a precursor to the recognition of marriage equality, most of the state of Iowa’s alleged 
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justifications for excluding same-sex couples from marital rights—which included protecting 
traditional definitions of marriage, promoting procreation, and ensuring stability for opposite-sex 
couples and their children—are inherently speculative.119  A judicial decision in favor of 
marriage equality, though, necessarily tests those justifications.  And, as Massachusetts and Iowa 
have demonstrated, the public has shown stronger support for equality as a result. 
Meanwhile, there is reason to believe that, in the near future, a U.S. Supreme Court 
decision recognizing same-sex marriage would not marshal such popular support or immediately 
quell the controversy inherent to this issue.  Lawrence v. Texas, for example, unwittingly 
transformed same-sex marriage into a national headline and a mainstay within the country’s 
political discourse, and simultaneously ushered in an era of uncertainty and backlash regarding 
same-sex marriage.120  Though its holding was about decriminalizing sodomy at a time when that 
practice was scarcely punishable and even more rarely punished, Lawrence shows the Supreme 
Court’s potential to polarize public opinion and even garner opposition to the grant of minorities’ 
rights.  Perhaps in uniformity with the so-called “law of small change,”121 a sweeping Supreme 
Court opinion about same-sex marriage could ultimately undermine confidence in the Court and 
be a setback for public support of marriage equality.  For advocates of equal rights, such a 
reaction would also serve to undermine the objective of achieving the “social and public 
recognition of a private commitment” that is unique to civil marriage.122  That is, without public 
support, the jointly private and public legitimacy of same-sex relationships cannot fully be 
realized. 
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 Therefore, it is state courts that currently provide the most appropriate avenue for 
deciding the marriage rights of gays and lesbians.  Allowing the arguments for and against 
marriage equality to play out quasi-experimentally at the state level should have the effect of 
gaining broader support and understanding for this minority through abating the controversy 
inherent in speculative arguments against marriage equality.  Also, state courts are often more 
politically accountable than their federal counterparts, which reduces the likelihood of popular 
outrage against decisions that may otherwise be attributed to judicial activism or a lack of 
consideration for the will of the electorate.  In sum, as the trajectory of support for gay rights 
continues to broadly move in the direction of support, state courts should be able to recognize 
same-sex marriages with increasing regularity and long-term effects that include greater public 
support and confidence in the courts as a source for proclaiming  marriage equality. 
